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Abstract. Much research in logic programming and non-monotonic rea-
soning originates from dissatisfaction with classical logic as a knowledge
representation language, and with classical deduction as a mode for au-
tomated reasoning. Discarding these classical roots has generated many
interesting and fruitful ideas. However, to ensure the lasting impact of
the results that have been achieved, it is important that they should not
remain disconnected from their classical roots. Ultimately, a clear pic-
ture should emerge of what the achievements of answer set programming
mean in the context of classical logic, so that they may be given their
proper place in the canon of science. In this paper, a look at different
aspects of ASP, in an effort to identify precisely the limitations of classi-
cal logic that they exposed and investigate how the ASP approaches can
be transferred back to the classical setting. Among the issues we thus
address are the closed world assumption, “classical” and default nega-
tion, default reasoning with exceptions, definitions, lp-functions and the
interpolation technique and the strong introspection operator. We inves-
tigate the ASP-methodology to encode knowledge using these language
constructs and come across a dichotomy in the ASP-methodology.
1 Introduction
In the late fifties, a thesis of logic-based AI was that classical first order logic (FO)
and deductive theorem provers for FO would play a key role in building intelligent
systems [21]. In the late sixties and early seventies, the disappointing results of
this project led a number of new research directions. In logic-based AI, two
areas that arose as a reaction were logic programming (LP) and non-monotonic
reasoning. In logic programming, the idea was that FO was too expressive and
had to be restricted to Horn clause logic to allow efficient theorem proving [16].
The origin of non-monotonic reasoning lies in the dissatisfaction about the use
of FO for representing common sense knowledge. To overcome the limitations
of FO, new logics and logic principles were studied. Examples are the Closed
World Assumption [26], Circumscription [22] and Default logic [28]. Although
having completely different points of departure, both areas converged in the
late eighties and early nineties mainly under the influence of Michael Gelfond
and Vladimir Lifschitz who sought to explain logic programming with negation
as failure using non-monotonic reasoning principles [12], and turn it into an
expressive knowledge representation language [13]. Michael and Vladimir thus
became founding fathers of the field of Answer Set Programming (ASP) [1],
which has developed into a flourishing, dynamic field with many applications
and powerful systems [9, 8].
Currently, there is undeniably a large conceptual gap between ASP and clas-
sical logic. As a long-term situation, this is undesirable. First of all, despite its
limitations, FO provides a set of essential connectives, together with a well-
understood methodology for their use, which makes it an invaluable kernel for
KR languages. Second, the conceptual gap also hampers recognition of ASP’s
contributions to AI and computational logic, thus compromising the use of the
ASP languages and tools in other fields.
This paper will try to identify limitations of classical logic exposed by Gel-
fond’s work and investigate how the ASP solutions can be transferred back into
classical logic. This boils down to identifying important forms of knowledge, to
study how they are represented in ASP and to investigate how they can be rep-
resented in (extensions of) FO. Thus, this paper also studies the methodology of
ASP, and compares it with the methodology of FO. It identifies also key contri-
butions of the ASP language and integrates them with FO. Among the issues we
thus address are the closed world assumption, “classical” and default negation,
default reasoning with exceptions, definitions, lp-functions and the interpolation
technique and the strong introspection operator.
Integrating classical logic and ASP is not a trivial task, as research on rule
languages for the semantic web is now also discovering [25]. Expanding the sta-
ble semantics to the syntax of FO as in [10] is obviously redefining FO, not
integrating ASP and FO. Among subtle problems and tricky mismatches, one
glaring difference clearly stands out: ASP uses the answer set as its basic seman-
tic construct, whereas FO of course uses interpretations (or structures). There is
a profound difference between the two concepts. As defined in [13], an answer set
is a set of literals that represents a possible state of belief that a rational agent
might derive from the logic program. In other words, an answer set is subjective;
it does not talk directly about the world itself, but only about the beliefs of an
agent about this world. This conception of answer sets is not a philosophical
afterthought, but is tightly connected with the view of negation as failure as
a modal, epistemic or default operator, and therefore truly lies at the heart of
ASP. By contrast, FO has a possible world semantics, in which each model of a
theory represents a state of the world that is possible according to this theory.
In other words, FO is concerned with objective forms of knowledge, that do not
involve propositional attitudes such as the belief or knowledge of an epistemic
agent, etc. Modal extensions of classical logic that can express such forms of
subjective knowledge typically use Kripke structures (or the special case of sets
of possible worlds) as a semantic object.
Answer sets fall between classical interpretations and Kripke structures: an
answer set represents a belief state, and thus differs from an interpretation which
describes a possible state of the world, but it does so in a less complex and less
accurate way than a Kripke structure or sets of possible worlds, since it only de-
scribes what literals are believed rather than arbitrary formulas. This mismatch
between ASP’s basic semantic constructs and the semantic constructs of FO and
its modal extensions seriously complicates the task of formally comparing ASP
with FO, and it will be the focus of much of this paper. We will come across a
dichotomy in the use of ASP programs: in some, an answer set represents the
belief state of an existing rational agent, in many others the programmer care-
fully crafts the mind of an imaginary agent so that solutions of a problem can be
extracted from the belief sets of that agent. This dichotomy stands orthogonal to
the (many) ways in which stable semantics can be formalised [18]. We will show
that this leads to two different methodologies and, de facto, to two different KR
languages, as pointed out long time ago by Gelfond and Lifschitz[13] and, from
a different angle, in [6].
Overview In Section 2 we briefly recall the relevant basics of answer set program-
ming and first order logic. In Section 3, we discuss the basic semantic principles
of knowledge representation in ASP and contrast them with those of FO. We
distinguish two methodologies for knowledge representation in ASP. In Section 4
we introduce FO(ID), the extension of first order logic with inductive definitions.
In Section 5 we take a close look at different forms of objective knowledge, how
they are represented in ASP and what is their representation in FO(ID). We
discuss unique names and domain closure assumptions, different forms of closed
world assumptions, the representation of definitions in ASP and defaults. In
Section 6, we extend FO with a simple epistemic operator with which we can
simulate negation as failure and strong negation.
2 Preliminaries of ASP and FO
We briefly recall the basic concepts of Answer Set Programming and of classical
logic. A vocabulary Σ consists of a set ΣFun of constant and function symbols
and a set ΣPred of predicate symbols. An answer set program P over vocabulary
Σ is a collection of rules l : - l1, . . . , lm, not lm+1, . . . , not ln. and constraints:
: - l1, . . . , lm, not lm+1, . . . , not ln. where each l, li is an atom P(t1, . . . , tk) or
a strong negation literal ¬P(t1, . . . , tk). A constraint is seen as a special rule
defining F as a new symbol: F : - not F, l1, . . . , lm, not lm+1, . . . , not ln. An answer
set program with variables is seen usually as the set of all ground instances
obtained by substituting ground terms ofΣ for all variables. A disjunctive answer
set program is a set of rules where the head l may be a disjunction l′1 v . . . v l
′
k
of atoms and strong negation literals.
An answer set A of P is a set of ground atoms and strong negation literals
such that A is a ⊆-minimal element in the collection of all sets S of such literals
that have the property that, for each rule
l′1v . . . vl
′
k : - l1, . . . , lm, not lm+1, . . . , not ln.
if l1, . . . , lm ∈ S and lm+1, . . . , ln /∈ A, then at least one l′i ∈ S.
Note that for a constraint, there exists at least one literal li such that either
1 ≤ i ≤ m and li /∈ A or m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n and li ∈ A.
As for the informal semantics, an answer set program P is seen as the repre-
sentation of all knowledge of some rational introspective epistemic agent. A rule
l′1v . . . vl
′
k : - l1, . . . , lm, notlm+1, . . . , notln. expresses that this agent believes one
of l′k if he believes l1, . . . , lm to be true and considers it possible that each of
lm+1, . . . , ln is false. The agent obeys a rationality principle, that is that he does
not believe an atom or a strong negation literal unless his theory gives him an
argument for believing it. In the answer set semantics, this rationality principle
is formalized by the minimality requirement. Each answer set represents the set
of believed literals in one of the possible states of belief of the agent.
First order logic (FO) formulas ϕ over vocabulary Σ are constructed us-
ing standard inductive rules for ∧,¬,∨,⇒,⇔,∃,∀. A Σ-interpretation I (or
Σ-structure) consists of a domain UI , for each function symbol F/n an n-ary
function F I : UnI → UI and for each predicate symbol P/n an n-ary relation
P I on UI . The interpretation of a term and the satisfaction of a formula under
I and some variable assignment θ is defined by standard inductive rules, such
as (F (t1, . . . , tn))Iθ = F Iθ(tIθ1 , . . . , t
Iθ
n ) and the (non-monotonic) inductive rule
for the truth of negated formulas: Iθ |= ¬ϕ if Iθ 6|= ϕ. The interpretation of
variable-free ground terms t and sentences ϕ does not depend on the variable
assignment θ. We use tI to denote t’s interpretation and write I |= ϕ (I is a
model ) to denote that ϕ is satisfied in Iθ for arbitrary θ.
A Herbrand interpretation is one in which UI is the set of ground terms of
Σ (called the Herbrand universe) and I interprets each ground term t by itself,
i.e., for each function symbol F and all term tuples t1, . . . , tn, F I(t1, . . . , tn) =
F (t1, . . . , tn). An alternative representation of a Herbrand interpretation is as a
set of its true ground atoms. In this representation, a Herbrand interpretation
is mathematically identical to an answer set of Σ. However, this is accidental
and should not be taken to mean that both concepts are the same: in Tarskian
model semantics, an interpretation (Herbrand or otherwise) does not represent
a state of belief of an agent.
3 Basic principles of knowledge representation in ASP
and FO
An exquisite property of FO is the clarity and precision of the informal semantics
of its connectives and quantifiers, and consequently, of its formulas. Tarskian
model semantics is a mathematical theory developed to formalize this informal
semantics. In the Tarskian model semantics, a model of an FO theory T is viewed
as an abstract representation of a state of the world that satisfies all axioms in
T , hence that is a possible world according to T . This makes FO an objective
language in that the truth of its formulas can be evaluated in the context of an
objective world state. This is in contrast to negation-as-failure literals not P in
ASP rules, whose truth is not determined by the material world but by the state
of belief of an epistemic agent.
An FO theory T over Σ can of course also be understood as representing a
state of belief of some agent. The belief state of T is formalized by the collection1
of its models: a model is a state of the world that is possible in that state of belief.
Such a collection of interpretations, henceforth called a collection (or set, in case)
of possible worlds, offers an extremely detailed representation of a belief state.
Therefore, sets of possible worlds are used in the semantics of (propositional)
epistemic logics such as kd45 as the representation of the belief state of the agent;
such sets correspond to Kripke structures with the total accessibility relation.
As a representation of a belief state of an agent, a collection of possible
worlds is vastly more precise than a (single) answer set. From any set of possible
worlds, the corresponding answer set is the set of literals that are satisfied in all.
But vice versa, not much information can be derived from an answer set of an
agent about his collection of possible worlds. For instance, take Σ = {P,Q} and
assume that all we know about some agent is that his answer set is ∅, i.e., he or
she knows (can derive) no literals. There are many sets of possible worlds with
that answer set; the agents possible world set could be the set of models of the
tautology true, or of P ∨Q, or ¬P ∨Q, or P ∨¬Q, or ¬P ∨¬Q, or P ⇔ Q and
more. In each case, he would not be able to derive a literal. Knowing only this
answer set, all we can tell about the possible worlds is that there is at least one
in which P is true and one in which P is false, and the same for Q. There is not
a single interpretation that can be decided to be a possible world or rejected to
be one. Hence, an answer set is a very coarse representation of a belief state. As
we illustrate now, this has major impact on ASP methodology.
An answer set of an ASP program represents the belief of a rational agent—
but who is this agent? The rational agent could be an existing epistemic entity
in the real world: it could be a knowledge base that is being queried, or it could
be us, the people writing the ASP program. As an example of this, we take the
following scenario from [13].
Example 1. Assume a database with complete knowledge about the GPA (Grade
Point Average) of students and partial knowledge about whether they belong to
a minority group. A student is eligible for a grant if his GPA is high, or if
he has a fair GPA and belongs to a minority. The policy of the department
is to interview students who may be (but are not necessarily) eligible. In ASP,
incomplete databases can be represented by a theory consisting of ground literals,
such as:
FairGPA(Bob). Minority(Bob). ¬Minority(Dave).
FairGPA(Ann). HighGPA(John).
The partial completeness of this database is expressed by two CWA rules:
¬FairGPA(x)← not FairGPA(x).
¬HighGPA(x)← not HighGPA(x).
1 In general, the collection of models of an FO theory is too large to be a set.
The next rule expresses who is to be interviewed:
Interview(x)← FairGPA(x), not Minority(x), not¬Minority(x).
In the database, Ann is the only student with fair GPA and unknown minority
status. This ASP program has a unique answer set including the literals in
the database and the atom Interview(Ann). This corresponds to our beliefs
about this domain; hence, the rational agent can be viewed to be us, the ASP
programmer. Our possible worlds are all Herbrand interpretations satisfying the
literals in the answer set. In the CWA rules and the Interview rule, the epistemic
nature of negation as failure is well exploited, in the latter to verify that the
KB knows that person x is neither a minority nor a non-minority. This is an
interesting sort of application that cannot be directly expressed in classical logic.
Many present-day examples of ASP concern computational problems such
as graph coloring, Hamiltonian path, planning and scheduling problems, and
many others. The only epistemic entity around in such domains is us, the people
writing the ASP programs. Our knowledge is about data and the properties
of a correct solution. The solutions that we want our systems to compute are
given by certain output predicates in worlds that are possible according to this
knowledge – the coloring predicate in a state in which the graph is correctly
colored, the action predicates in a state where the actions form a correct plan,
and so on. Unfortunately, our knowledge in such domains is highly disjunctive
and there is no way in which possible worlds could be reconstructed from the
set of literals that we “believe”, i.e., that can be derived from our knowledge.
For such domains, ASP developed a successful alternative methodology that
makes use of a “virtual” non-existent agent. The “mind” of this figment of our
imagination has been craftily constructed by us, the answer set programmer, in
such a way that each of his possible belief sets corresponds to a single correct
solution of the problem, i.e., to a possible world.
Example 2. The following ASP program represents the graph coloring problem
for a given graph:
color(x, R) v color(x, B) v color(x, G) :- node(x).
:- color(x,c), color(y,c), edge(x,y).
node(1). node(2). node(3). edge(1,2). edge(2,3). edge(1,3).
This program produces 6 answer sets, each of which corresponds to a coloring
of the graph. E.g., the answer set
{ node(1). node(2). node(3). edge(1,2). edge(2,3). edge(1,3).
color(1,R). color(2,B). color(3,G).}
tells us that the (unique) color of 1 is R, that of 2 is B, and that of 3 is G.
Obviously, this one answer set does not describe our beliefs about the colorings
of this graph, since we know that there also exists, e.g., a coloring in which node
1 is not R.
In this example, and in many other ASP applications, our knowledge is repre-
sented by the set of possible worlds consisting of all Herbrand interpretations
that are mathematically identical to the answer sets of the virtual agent. And
there is no way in which the possible worlds, and hence, the solutions to the
problem, could be extracted from our belief set.
The above observations show us that in ASP two different methodologies
are in use. That of Example 1, called henceforth the ASP-belief methodology, is
to represent the belief state(s) of an existing epistemic agent in the field. The
second, called ASP-world methodology (Example 2), aims to characterize a col-
lection of possible worlds by an answer set program of a virtual agent whose
states of belief correspond to possible worlds. There is a simple heuristic crite-
rion to determine which of these methodologies is used in an ASP application.
Indeed, a real epistemic agent such as us or an existing knowledge base may have
incomplete knowledge about the application domain, but in practice it is clear
what this agent believes. I.e., the epistemic agent has a unique state of belief.
Hence, ASP-belief programs typically have a unique answer set while ASP-world
programs often have multiple answer sets.
The distinction between the ASP-belief and ASP-world methodologies is rem-
iniscent of a discussion in Michael Gelfond’s and Vladimir Lifschitz’s seminal
1991 paper [13]. In this paper, they state that a set of rules without strong nega-
tion and disjunction can be viewed either as a general logic program or as an
answer set program. In both cases the semantics of such a rule set is determined
by the same stable models. The crucial difference, dixit Gelfond and Lifschitz, is
that a stable model of the rule set, viewed as a general logic program, represents
a Herbrand interpretation, i.e., a possible world, while it represents an answer
set in the second case. There is an evident match here between general logic pro-
gramming and the ASP-world methodology: ASP-world is the KR methodology
of general logic programming. The distinction between general logic programs
and answer set programs lays purely on the informal level. This might explain
why it did not enter the eye of the ASP community and why the concept of gen-
eral logic programs has not catched on in the ASP community. Yet, at present, it
seems that the vast majority of ASP applications follows the ASP-world method-
ology and these programs are therefore to be viewed as (extensions of) general
logic programs.
The relevance of distinguishing between these two methodologies is that in
each different style, different kinds of knowledge can be represented, or the same
knowledge is to be represented in different ways. Which methodology is cho-
sen depends on the available knowledge and on the problem to be solved, e.g.,
whether a solution is (part of) a possible world, or what a KB knows/believes. If
we want to match ASP to FO, our effort will therefore need to be parameterized
on the particular way in which ASP is used. In the remainder of this paper, we
will investigate how different sorts of knowledge can be represented in ASP-belief
or ASP-world and in (extensions of) FO.
4 Adding (inductive) definitions to FO
A prototypical ASP-world application is the Hamiltonian cycle problem. The
goal is to compute a Hamiltonian cycle through the graph, i.e., a path that
passes through each node exactly once and then returns to the initial node. A
typical ASP encoding is given by:
in(X, Y) v out(X, Y) :- edge(X,Y).
reached(X) :- reached(Y), in(Y,X).
reached(X) :- start(Y), in(Y,X).
:- node(X), not reached(X).
:- in(X,Y), in(X,Z), Y != Z.
:- in(X,Y), in(Z,Y), X != Z.
node(1). node(2). node(3). edge(1,2). edge(2,3). edge(1,3).
The reachability relation defined in this program is a well-known example
of an inductively definable concept that cannot be expressed in FO[17]. Defini-
tional knowledge is an important form of human expert knowledge [4, 7]. While
simple non-inductive definitions can be expressed through explicit definitions
∀x¯(P (x¯) ⇔ ϕP [x¯]), FO needs to be extended for inductive definitions. In the
logic FO(LFP) [17], FO is extended with a least fixpoint construct. The defini-
tion of the reached relation would be expressed as:
∀x(Reached(x)⇔ lfpR,x[(∃y (Start(y) ∨R(y)) ∧ In(y, x))
]
(x)
In FO(ID) [7], inductive definitions are represented in a rule-based syntax, similar
to the ASP encoding.{∀x Reached(x)← ∃y Reached(y) ∧ In(y, x).
∀x Reached(x)← ∃y Start(y) ∧ In(y, x).
}
A rule (over Σ) is an expression of the form ∀x¯ P (t¯) ← ϕ where P (t¯) is an
atomic formula and ϕ an FO formula, and ← is the definitional implication. A
definition ∆ is a set of rules. A predicate symbol P in the head of a rule of ∆ is
called a defined predicate of ∆; a symbol of Σ that occurs in ∆ but is not defined
by it is called a parameter or open symbol of ∆. The set of defined predicates is
denoted Def(∆), the remaining symbols Param(∆). An FO(ID) theory is a set
of FO sentences and definitions.
The satisfaction relation |= of FO(ID) is defined through the standard induc-
tive rules for FO with one additional rule:
– I |= ∆, if I|Def(∆) = wfm∆I|Param(∆)
where wfm∆I|Param(∆) is the parameterized well-founded model of ∆ in the inter-
pretation I|Param(∆). That is, to check whether I is a model, we restrict I to
the parameter symbols of ∆, extend this interpretation by performing the well-
founded model construction in [29]2 and verify whether this well-founded model
2 The well-founded model construction of [29] extends the original one of [30] by
allowing arbitrary FO bodies and parameter symbols (interpreted by an extensional
database).
coincides with the (2-valued) interpretation I on the defined symbols. The well-
founded semantics formalizes the most common forms of inductive definitions
such as monotone inductive definitions (e.g., reachability) and (non-monotone)
definitions by induction over a well-founded order (e.g., the satisfaction relation
I |= ϕ) [7].
In the next section, we identify useful, objective forms of knowledge that can
be nicely encoded in ASP and we investigate how to represent them in FO(ID).
5 Representing objective knowledge in ASP and FO(ID)
5.1 Representing UNA and DCA
Implicitly, ASP maintains the Unique Names Assumption (UNA(Σ)) [27] that
all ground terms of ΣFun represent different objects, and the Domain Closure
Assumption (DCA(Σ)) [27] that each object in the universe is represented by at
least one ground term of ΣFun. These assumptions hold in many applications
(e.g., databases), but neither UNA nor DCA are imposed in FO. That is, in FO
they should be explicitly expressed.
UNA(Σ) is expressed by the FO theory UNAFO(Σ) that consists of, for each
pair of different function symbols F/n,G/m ∈ Σ [27]:
∀x¯y¯ ¬(F (x¯) = G(y¯))
∀x¯y¯ F (x¯) = F (y¯)⇒ x¯ = y¯
It follows from the compactness of FO, that DCA(Σ) cannot be expressed in FO,
but it can be expressed in FO(ID) through the following theory DCAFO(ID)(Σ): . . .∀x¯ U(F (x¯))← U(x1) ∧ · · · ∧ U(xn).
. . .

∀x U(x)
where the definition consists of one rule for each constant or function symbol
F/n ∈ Σ and U is a new predicate representing the universe. The models of
UNAFO(Σ) ∧DCAFO(ID)(Σ) are the Herbrand interpretations (up to isomor-
phism).
In many applications, UNA and DCA are too strong. For instance, in the
applications typically considered in description logics, neither holds. In other
applications, these axioms are applicable to only a subset σ of ΣFun. A (very)
early example of this is Peano arithmetic, Peano’s standard second order theory
of the natural numbers where σ = {0, S/1}. This theory contains UNAFO(σ)
and a second order axiom expressing DCA(σ), i.e., the induction axiom. Thus,
UNA and DCA are not applied to +/2 and ×/2, the two other function symbols
of Peano’s theory.
In view of this, a number of variants of the ASP language have been designed
with relaxations of UNA and/or DCA. An early one in which UNA still holds
but DCA is dropped was proposed by Gelfond and Przymusinska [14]. In [19],
an extension of ASP with functions is defined. This ASP extension applies the
kind of relaxed UNA+DCA(σ) axioms as observed above in Peano arithemetic.
As a consequence, other function symbols represent arbitrary functions in the
Herbrand universe of σ. In Open Answer Set Programming [15], UNA and DCA
are dropped altogether. Applications of all these extensions arguably follow the
ASP-world methodology: answer sets represent belief states of a virtual agent
but possible worlds of the human expert.
5.2 Different forms of CWA in complete and partial databases
The general idea of the Closed World Assumption (CWA) [26] in the context
of a theory T is the assumption that atoms that cannot be derived from T
are false. In the context of incomplete knowledge, this principle often leads to
inconsistency and needs to be relaxed. There are different options to do that. In
fact, ASP-belief and ASP-world provide different forms of CWA.
In ASP-belief, CWA is expressed through ASP formulas of the form:
¬P(x¯) : - not P(x¯).
Informally, the rule states that P(x¯) is false if it is consistent to assume so. Such
rules can be used to represent databases with complete and partial knowledge.
Thus, the epistemic not connective of ASP allows us to explicitate a local form
of CWA.
Example 3. An ASP-belief representation of a complete database :
FairGPA(Bob). Minority(Bob). FairGPA(Ann). HighGPA(John).
¬FairGPA(x)← not FairGPA(x).
¬HighGPA(x)← not HighGPA(x).
¬Minority(x)← not Minority(x).
By deleting the CWA rule for Minority and adding strong negation literal
¬Minority(Dave) we obtain the partial database with incomplete knowledge
of Example 1.
In ASP-world, no CWA axioms need to be added; on the contrary, axioms are
needed to express where the CWA does not hold. Thus in ASP-world, (a form
of) CWA is implicit and needs to be overruled when necessary.
Example 4. An ASP-world representation of the complete database of Exam-
ple 3:
FairGPA(Bob). Minority(Bob). FairGPA(Ann). HighGPA(John).
The partial database of Example 1 is represented by extending this with a con-
straint and a disjunctive rule to open up Minority:
Minority(x) v Minority∗(x).
: - Minority(Dave).
There are several alternative syntaxes to do the latter in ASP, such as the lparse
syntax “0{Minority(x)}1.” or the traditional cycle over negation:
Minority(x) : - not Minority∗(x).
Minority∗(x) : - not Minority(x).
Interestingly, the mathematical closure principle underlying stable semantics,
according to which an atom belongs to a stable model only if it can be derived
by a rule, acts as a rationality principle in ASP-belief, but as a form of CWA
in ASP-world! This is a clear example of how the same form of knowledge is
represented in different ways in ASP-belief or ASP-world. Note that adding
CWA-rules in ASP-world such as ¬FairGPA(x)← not FairGPA(x) is of no use:
it expresses that the virtual epistemic agent has CWA on this predicate but not
that we, the ASP programmer, have CWA on FairGPA. The effect is merely
to add strong negation literals such as ¬FairGPA(John) to all answer sets, but
strong negation literals are irrelevant since they are ignored when computing the
possible worlds from the virtual agent’s answer sets.
Recapitulating, in ASP-belief, CWA is not imposed unless explicit rules are
added; in ASP-world, CWA is imposed unless overridden explicitly by rules that
open up an atom.
The CWA cannot be expressed directly in FO, due to FO’s monotonicity.
However, a local form of CWA can be simulated through predicate completion
[5] , as in the axiom:
∀x(FairGPA(x)⇔ x = Bob ∨ x = Ann)
An alternative solution in FO(ID) is to use definitions to close predicates. The
above partial database is represented in FO(ID) as:{
FairGPA(Bob). FairGPA(Ann).
}{
HighGPA(John).
}
Minority(Bob). ¬Minority(Dave).
Inductive definitions in mathematics quite clearly comprise some form of CWA.
Indeed, an object or tuple does not belong to an inductively defined set unless it
is explicitly derived by a rule application. It is not uncommon to find inductive
definitions in mathematical texts that contain explicit CWA-like statements, as
in the following definition:
We define the set of natural numbers by induction:
– 0 is a natural number;
– if n is a natural number then n+ 1 is a natural number;
– no other objects are natural numbers.
Thus, definitions are an informal form of CWA that we understand with great
precision. In one of the next sections, we will use this form of CWA to represent
defaults.
The following example shows that the CWA’s expressed in ASP-belief differ
from the one implicit in ASP-world and in definitions.
Example 5. In the context of the complete student database of Example 3, the
following ASP-belief rules express which students are eligible for a grant :
Eligible(x) : - HighGPA(x).
Eligible : - FairGPA(x), Minority(x).
¬Eligible(x) : - not Eligible(x)
There is a problem with this representation in the context of the incomplete
database. Indeed, Ann has a fair GPA but an unknown Minority status, and
hence, is unknown to be eligible. Hence, the CWA rule jumps to the wrong
conclusion that she is not eligible3. An ASP-world representation of eligibility
is obtained by dropping the CWA rule from this definition. This is similar to
FO(ID), where the predicate Eligible can be defined as:{∀x(Eligible(x)← HighGPA(x).
∀x(Eligible← FairGPA(x) ∧Minority(x)).
}
The ASP-world representation as well as the FO(ID) representation is correct
whether the database is complete or only partially complete.
An ASP-belief CWA rule turns ignorance of an atom into falsity. Intuitively,
if there is one possible world in the agents belief state where the atom is false, the
atom is false in all possible worlds. In contrast, in ASP-world and in definitions
of FO(ID), a defined atom is false in a possible world if it cannot be produced
by rule application in that particular world. Thus, in one world, Ann might be
eligible and in another she might not be. This is a weaker form of CWA than
the one expressed in ASP-belief, but more useful in this application. This clearly
shows that the form of CWA that can be expressed in ASP-belief differs from
the form of CWA implicit in ASP-world and in FO(ID) definitions.
5.3 Representing definitions in ASP
Definitions are important in KR [4]. Many applications, also in ASP, contain
rules that make up for a definition of one or more predicates. Examples in this
paper are the rule defining Interview in Example 1 and the rules for Eligible
in the previous section. (Inductive) definitions can be correctly represented in
ASP-world and of course in FO(ID). It is more difficult to represent them in
ASP-belief, as we saw in the previous section.
As shown in Example 5, representing definitions in ASP-belief is simple as
long as the ASP program has complete knowledge on the parameter predicates.
In that case, it suffices to add a CWA rule to the rules expressing the defini-
tion. Such a representation unfortunately leads to errors in case of incomplete
databases (The parameter predicate Minority is incomplete in Example 5). To
solve this problem in ASP-belief, we can use the interpolation technique devel-
oped by Baral, Gelfond and Kosheleva in [2, 3]. They develop a technique to
3 We will discuss a solution for this problem in Section 5.3.
approximate lp-functions by an answer set program. An lp-function consists of
a set of rules (without strong negation) and a set of input and output param-
eters. There is a clear and intuitive match between definitions of FO(ID) and
lp-functions: a definition can be seen as an lp-function with the definitions pa-
rameters matching the input parameters, and the defined predicates matching
the output parameters of the corresponding lp-function. The algorithm that they
propose can be used to translate the rules for Eligible into an interpolation: an
answer set program that approximates the original rules in the context of an
incomplete database. Applying this algorithm on the rules of Eligible yields:
MayBeMinority(x)← not¬Minority(x).
Eligible(x)← HighGPA(x).
Eligible(x)← FairGPA(x), Minority(x).
MaybeEligible(x)← HighGPA(x).
MaybeEligible(x)← FairGPA(x), MayBeMinority(x).
¬Eligible(x)← notMaybeEligible(x).
The algorithm adds predicates representing students that might be minorities
or might be eligible and defines ¬Eligible as the complement of the maybe
eligible predicate.
The algorithm depends on which predicates the database has incomplete
knowledge about and needs to be modified when more parameter predicates
are unknown (e.g., FairGPA, HighGPA). The correctness and the accuracy of the
approach depends on certain conditions as expressed in the correctness theorem
in [3]. In particular, if there is disjunctive knowledge on the parameters of the
definition, accuracy will be lost. For instance, if we add to the database that also
John has a fair GPA and either he or Ann is a minority but not both, then the
natural conclusion that either John or Ann is not eligible cannot be drawn from
an interpolation.
This shows that representing definitions in ASP-belief has its pitfalls. Also,
it shows that introducing incomplete knowledge in ASP-belief has more impact
on the representation than in ASP-world and FO(ID).
5.4 Representing defaults
Nonmonotonic Reasoning has its motivation in the problems of FO for repre-
senting common sense knowledge [23]. One problem is the qualification problem:
many universally quantified statements are subject to a very long, if not endless
list of qualifications and refinements. The standard example is the statement that
birds can fly. But what about ostriches? Chickens? Chicks? Birds with clipped
or broken wings? Etc. All we can say is: normally, a bird can fly, or most birds
can fly. This gave rise to the domain of defaults and default reasoning. Defaults
are approximative statements and reason about normality (typically, normally,
usually, often, most, few, ..).
An essential part of human intelligence is the ability to reason with incom-
plete, vague, and uncertain information. When such information is represented
in classical logic, where sentences are either wholly true or wholly false, the result
is a crisp approximation of the fuzzy reality. The knowledge of a human expert
evolves with time, e.g., when he learns more about particular objects or comes
across new special cases and exceptions. Hence, the theory has to be continually
refined and revised. An important issue here is elaboration tolerance; the ease by
which new knowledge can be integrated in an old theory.
Let us illustrate this in a traditional example scenario. Assume that we want
to represent knowledge about locomotion of animals. We know that most birds
fly and that Tweety and Clyde are birds. If that is all we know, it is reasonable
to assume that both fly. One approximately correct FO theory that entails the
desired conclusions is:
T =
{∀x(Bird(x)⇒ Fly(x)), Bird(Tweety) ∧Bird(Clyde)}
Next, we find out that Tweety is a penguin and want to extend our theory to,
e.g.,
∀x(Penguin(x)⇒ Bird(x)),∀x(Penguin⇒ ¬Fly(x)), P enguin(Tweety)
However, this theory is inconsistent, and we also need to weaken the axiom that
birds fly:
∀x(Bird(x) ∧ ¬Penguin(x)⇒ Fly(x))
Unfortunately, we now have lost the desirable but defeasible conclusion that
Clyde flies. Adding the reasonable assumption ¬Penguin(Clyde) (since “most
birds are not penguins”) would solve the problem, at the risk of adding poten-
tially false information, since our assumption may be wrong. And even if Clyde
turns out to be an eagle, we might later find out that he is a chick, and these
don’t fly. Clearly, FO’s lack of elaboration tolerance makes it quite messy to
maintain our formula that most birds fly.
An important goal of nonmonotonic reasoning is to design elaboration tolerant
logics and methodologies that support this process of representing and refining
evolving expert knowledge. For defaults, ASP achieves elaboration tolerance by
means of its non-monotonic negation not, which allows additional exceptions to
existing rules to be added with minimal effort:
Flies(x) : - Bird(x), not Abnormal(x).
Abnormal(x) : - Penguin(x).
Adding an additional exception can now be done by the almost trivial oper-
ation of introducing a new rule with the abnormality predicate in its head.
In the context of FO, we can achieve a remarkably similar effect, by again
turning to the inductive definition construct of FO(·). Indeed, inductive defi-
nitions are essentially a non-monotonic language construct, in the sense that
the operation of adding a new definitional rule to an existing definition is a
non-monotonic operation, due to the CWA embodied in a definition. We can
leverage this property to represent a default d stating that “P s are typically Qs”
as follows:
∀x P (x) ∧ ¬Abd(x)⇒ Q(x)
{∀x Abd(x)← f.}
This theory defines the abnormality predicate as empty, and is therefore equiv-
alent to the sentence ∀x P (x) ⇒ Q(x). However, when new exceptions to the
default come to light, they can easily be added as new definitional rules. For
instance, if we discover that the default does not apply to Rs:
∀x P (x) ∧ ¬Abd(x)⇒ Q(x){
∀x Abd(x)← f.
∀x Abd(x)← R(x).
}
This has the effect of turning the theory into one equivalent to ∀x P (x)∧¬R(x)⇒
Q(x), but does so in an elaboration tolerant way.
In a sense, every definition includes a kind of default information, namely that
the defined concept is false by default, where the rules express the exceptions.
For instance, the definition:
{∀x Square(x)← Rectangle(x) ∧Rhombus(x).}
expresses that objects typically are not squares, with those objects that are both
a rectangle and a rhombus forming an exception to this general rule. This allows
us to represent certain kinds of interplaying defaults in a quite compact but still
elaboration tolerant way. For instance, the following definition expresses that
“animals typically do not fly (d1), but birds are an exception, in the sense that
these typically do fly (d2), unless they happen to be penguins, which typically
do not fly (d3)”: 
∀x F lies(x)← Bird(x) ∧ ¬Abd2(x).
∀x Abd2(x)← Penguin(x) ∧ ¬Abd3(x).
∀x Abd3(x)← f.

A new exception to d1 might be that all bats also fly: this is the simple update
of adding the definitional rule ∀x F lies(x)← Bat(x) ∧ ¬Abd4(x) and an empty
definition for the latter abnormality predicate. A new exception to d2 might be
a bird with a broken wing: ∀x Abd2(x) ← BrokenWing(x). Finally, a penguin
with a jet pack: ∀x Abd3(x)← JetPack(x).
6 Adding an epistemic operator to FO(·)
In this section, we are concerned with expressing inherently epistemic ASP ap-
plications of the kind that can be expressed in ASP-belief. For this, we return to
Example 1, where we had an ASP-belief partial knwoledge base with the follow-
ing rule to express that students with fair GPA and unknown minority status
need to be interviewed:
Interview(x)← FairGPA(x), not Minority(x), not¬Minority(x).
In ASP-world, the latter rule does not work for the simple reason that the virtual
agent has different beliefs about minority students than the knowledge base (or
we) has. E.g., in the context of the ASP-world partial database of Example 4,
adding the above rule would lead to one answer set containing Minority(Ann)
and no Interview(Ann) and another answer set without Minority(Ann) but with
Interview(Ann). This is not what we need.
To express this example in a natural way, an epistemic operator is needed as
provided in autoepistemic logic (AEL [24]). Applying the translation from ASP
to AEL [12], we obtain a correct AEL representation:
FairGPA(Bob) ∧Minority(Bob) ∧ ¬Minority(Dave) ∧ FairGPA(Ann)
∀x(¬FairGPA(x)⇐ ¬KFairGPA(x))
∀x(Interview(x)⇐ FairGPA(x) ∧ ¬KMinority(x) ∧ ¬K¬Minority(x))
In general, due to its self-referential nature, an AEL theory may have multiple
stable expansions, each describing a different state of belief. This would be highly
undesirable in this application, since we want the knowledge base to come up
with a single set of people to be interviewed. Fortunately, the above theory is a
stratified one. Therefore, it has a unique stable expansion [20] which correctly
captures what the knowledge base knows.
For applications of this kind, it will suit us to develop an approach that is
both simpler and closer to FO than AEL. Given that we already have an FO
theory defining our incomplete database and its associated set of possible worlds,
it is natural to consider a layered approach, where we keep our original database
theory and just add an additional layer on top of that. This new layer is again
just another FO theory, with the exception that it may query the knowledge
contained in the database theory. More generally, it is of course equally possible
to consider many layers, each building on the knowledge contained in previous
layers. This suggests the following straightforward multi-modal extension of FO
for reasoning on knowledge bases composed from multiple knowledge sources.
Definition 1. An ordered epistemic theory T over vocabulary Σ is a finite set
of multi-modal logic theories over Σ that satisfies the following conditions:
– Each T ∈ T is a multi-modal logic theory, possibly using modal operators
KT ′ , where T ′ ∈ T .
– The modal operators are used in a stratified way, i.e., there is a partial order
< on T and if the modal literal KTϕ occurs in a formula of subtheory T ′ or
in the scope of another modal literal KT ′ψ, then T < T ′.
Intuitively, each T ∈ T is expressing the knowledge of a component of the
knowledge base. Theories in higher levels possess the knowledge of lower theories
and can query lower levels through expressions KTϕ. Note that if T is minimal
in <, then it is an FO theory. If T is maximal, then KT occurs nowhere in T .
Self-referential autoepistemic statements such as T = {¬KTP ⇒ P} cannot
be expressed in ordered epistemic logic. The benefit is that FO semantics extends
easily. To keep things simple and standard, we consider only Herbrand interpre-
tations of the vocabulary Σ. This effectively means that DCA(Σ) and UNA(Σ)
hold4 and moreover, that all function and constant symbols σ are rigid: they have
the same interpretation in all possible worlds. Let T |T denote the restriction of
T to {T ′ ∈ T |T ′ ≤ T}.
For any (Herbrand) Σ-interpretation M and variable assignment θ, we define
that Mθ satisfies a formula ϕ, denoted Mθ |= ϕ, by extending the standard
inductive rules of FO with one extra rule5:
– Mθ |= KTϕ if for each interpretation M ′ such that M ′ |= T |T , it holds that
M ′θ |= ϕ.
As usual, we define M |= ϕ for sentences ϕ -without free variables- if for some
variable assignment θ, Mθ |= ϕ. M satisfies an ordered epistemic theory T if
it satisfies each sentence in each T ∈ T . Thus, a theory T can be seen as the
distributed knowledge of a layered set of agents, where each higher agent posses
the knowledge of its lower agents but not vice versa. Just like an FO theory, an
ordered epistemic theory defines a unique possible world set, namely the set of
all its models.
A useful feature of this logic is that it is straightforward to extend it with
other objective language constructs in FO(·) such as definitions and aggregates.
In the sequel, we will include definitions in the examples.
It is easy to see how our example fits into ordered epistemic logic. Let DB
be either our FO or FO(ID) representation—it does not matter which—of the
incomplete database. We now build on top of this a second layer TI > DB,
consisting of a single definition:
TI =
{{∀x Interview(x)← FairGPA(x)∧
¬KDB(Minority(x)) ∧ ¬KDB(¬Minority(x)).
}}
Alternatively, we could of course also have used an FO equivalence:
T ′I =
{∀x Interview(x)⇔ FairGPA(x)∧
¬KDB(Minority(x)) ∧ ¬KDB(¬Minority(x)).
}
Note that we have strengthened the original implication specifying Interview
into an arguably more accurate definition.
4 A standard way in modal logic of relaxing the assumption of a fixed domain in all
worlds is to introduce a unary universe predicate U and allowing only relativized
quantifier formulas ∃x(U(x) ∧ ϕ) and ∀x(U(x) ⇒ ϕ).
5 Observe that this is the second time in this paper that we extend FO’s satisfaction
relation |= by adding a rule to its definition (the first time was for formal FO(ID)
definitions). This illustrates that the elaboration tolerant, non-monotonic update
operations that we used in Section 5.4 in the FO(ID) encoding of defaults, occurs
also in informal inductive definitions.
It is easy to see that the ordered epistemic theory T = (DB,TI) has two
models: one in which Ann is a minority member, one in which she is not. There-
fore, T entails that only Ann needs an interview.
While in many useful cases, an ordered epistemic theory can be viewed as an
autoepistemic theory, we will not delve in this.
Disjunction in ASP-belief– a epistemic operator in ASP-world
As shown in the beginning of this section, negation as failure cannot be used as
epistemic operator to query partial ASP-world knowledge bases. In [11], Gelfond
investigated this problem in the context of disjunctive answer set programs. To
motivate his approach, Gelfond illustrated the epistemic use of negation as failure
with Example 1 including the ASP-belief rule:
Interview(x)← FairGPA(x), not Minority(x), not ¬Minority(x).
This rule will correctly identify the students to be interviewed in all simple
ASP-belief databases. Next, Gelfond considered a database with the disjunctive
information that either Ann or Mike are members of a minority group:
FairGPA(Ann). FairGPA(Mike).
Minority(Ann) v Minority(Mike).
In this case, we would like to infer that both Ann and Mike need to be inter-
viewed. However, the program has two answer sets, one with Interview(Ann),
and another with Interview(Mike), and therefore, the answer of this program
to, e.g., the query Interview(Mike) is unknown.
To solve this problem, Gelfond proposed to add another epistemic operator
K to ASP, called the strong introspection operator, that queries whether a literal
is present in all answer sets. Using this operator, we can correctly express the
definition of Interview by:
Interview(x)← FairGPA(x), not K not Minority(x), not K Minority(x).
The resulting program has two correct answer sets:
{FairGPA(Ann), FairGPA(Mike), Minority(Ann), Interview(Ann), Interview(Mike)}
{FairGPA(Ann), FairGPA(Mike), Minority(Mike), Interview(Ann), Interview(Mike)}
This representation not only works for Gelfonds disjunctive datatase but also
for the ASP-world partial database of Example 4.
In ordered epistemic logic, the problem could be solved by the theory T
consisting of DB < T1 where T1 is as before and
DB =
{
FairGPA(Ann). FairGPA(Mike.)
Minority(Ann) ∨Minority(Mike).
}
This is a correct representation of the scenario and entails that both will be
interviewed.
What Gelfond basically observed here is that the use of disjunction in the
head turns an ASP-belief program into an ASP-world one. Before adding the
disjunction, the answer set represents a belief state of the knowledge base; after
adding the disjunction, this is no longer the case. The belief state of the knowl-
edge base is reflected by the set of possible worlds in which either Ann or Mike
is a minority. This belief set does not correspond to any of the two answer sets
of the disjunctive program. Thus, the use of disjunction in ASP leads here and
in many other cases to ASP-world programs. What we can conclude here is as
follows:
– Without strong introspection, ASP-world does not provide an autoepistemic
operator. ASP-world is not suitable to express introspective statements.
– ASP-belief is not suitable to express disjunctive information.
– Introduction of disjunction (in any of the known ways: disjunctive rule, loop
over negation, weight constraints) in a programs including epistemic opera-
tors may force us to modify the ASP program. In comparison, the represen-
tation in ordered epistemic FO(.) is more elaboration tolerant.
In conclusion, this section has considered an interesting class of epistemic
ASP-belief programs, namely, those in which conclusions need to be drawn from
incomplete knowledge bases. ASP’s combination of strong negation and NAF
allows such problems to be elegantly represented and most applications in which
strong negation plays a significant role seem to be of this kind. These applications
naturally exhibit a layered structure, in which each layer is a knowledge base
with its own area of expertise, and different layers may build on each other’s
knowledge. This suggest the simple epistemic logic that we have presented in
this section. This logic has the benefit of simplicity and, moreover, it integrates
effortlessly into classical logic or its extensions. While the logic is weaker than
AEL, in the sense that it does not allow self reference, it guarantees a unique
epistemic model, and it is possible to prove that inference tasks have a lower
complexity than in AEL and in disjunctive answer set programming.
7 Conclusion
Gelfond and Lifschitz have merged ideas of logic programming and non-monotonic
reasoning to build a practically useful KR-language — answer set programming.
In this paper, we have highlighted and analysed these contributions by investi-
gating what they contribute to classical first order logic (FO). We studied how
forms of knowledge for which ASP was designed can be represented in FO or in
suitable extensions of FO.
A prime factor in our analysis turned out to be the dichotomy between the
ASP-belief and ASP-world methodologies: whether a program is written so that
an answer set represents a belief set of an existing agent or a possible world.
This decision turns out to have an overwhelming effect on the knowledge repre-
sentation process in ASP:
– Some knowledge principles are implicit in one and not in the other (e.g.,
CWA).
– Some forms of knowledge can only be expressed in one (e.g., disjunction,
autoepistemic statements).
– Some forms of knowledge can be expressed in both, but in considerably
different ways (e.g., definitions – with interpolation in ASP-belief).
In the development of ASP, Gelfond and Lifschitz were led by the ASP-belief
view. In the current state of the art, it seems that by far most applications of
ASP are developed according to ASP-world view. We have explained the reason
for this: answer sets are simply too coarse grained to represent the belief state
of a real agent or knowledge base in sufficient detail.
To consolidate the contributions of ASP to KR, we believe that the best
strategy is to integrate its contributions to FO. The same holds also for other
KR-extensions of logic programming such as abductive logic programming. In
the past, we have been led by this idea in the development of FO(.). We have
shown here how ASP’s KR-contributions can be mapped to elaboration tolerant
FO(.) theories. For the development of FO(.), we are indebted to Michael Gelfond
and Vladimir Lifschitz, whose work, as can be seen in this paper, has been a
continous source of inspiration.
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